Since the 1994 Chechen war, analysts have written volumes about the evolution of-and lessons learned from-this ongoing conflict. Why has success eluded this Cold War superpower in subduing the small Caucasian republic? Russia has since hiccupped back and forth across the spectrum of conflict in the region and the years have provided much speculation as to why. For a decade, researchers have described Chechen terror, erosion of the Russian military, and the inconsistent resolve of the Russian population to support the Kremlin's actions. These are significant independent variables that might explain Russian failure in 1994. However, another less tangible factor-Richard Szafranski's paradigm of Neocortical Warfare-may explain Russia's poor performance in the initial invasion and the improved performance in 1999. To evaluate this concept, the author examines the influences of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and battlefield communications-prime factors in influencing combatants' perceptions-to gauge these factors' effects on the relative Russian performances in the separate invasions. He then holds the results up to the Neocortical lens to evaluate whether the concept is pertinent to the ongoing conflict in Chechnya.